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Fish on Academic Freedom: A Merited Assault on
Nonsense, But Perhaps a Bridge Too Far
Lawrence Alexander
In Versions of Academic Freedom: From Professionalism to
Revolution, Stanley Fish turns his prodigious intellectual and rhetorical
skills to debunking various inflated views of academic freedom and
defending a narrow, professional account of it. Academic freedom is
freedom possessed by the members of university and college departments
that is not granted to those outside the ivory towers. For Fish, that freedom
should rightly only extend to academics in the course of teaching,
researching, and publishing in accordance with the standards of their
academic disciplines. Beyond that, academics are merely employees and
citizens, with no privileges other than those possessed by other employees
and citizens.
Given Fish’s thesis, my job as a commentator is a difficult one. A
commentator is supposed to poke holes in the arguments of his target. He is
supposed to criticize, not laud. I, however, agree with Fish, not only with
his basic thesis, but also with his supporting arguments. In short, I’m stuck
with “I couldn’t have said it better myself.”
Nevertheless, there are perhaps a few jots and tittles in Fish’s
arguments that I can object to or at least query. I think Fish at times forgets
how completely inert the postmodern critique is, a point he otherwise
recognizes. And I think Fish, in attempting to hermetically seal off the
academy from external justification, has taken his argument farther than it
needs to be taken to secure his account of the academy and its freedom.
(That’s the “bridge too far” of my title.)
THE FISH VIEW OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
What is the role of an academic such that there is a tenable claim to a
freedom not possessed by others? Fish distinguishes five different
“schools” of conceptions of that role. The first is the “it’s just a job”
school. The academic’s job is to acquire and propagate knowledge
according to disciplinary norms. His is a profession in which competence is
judged by standards internal to the profession. Academic freedom is
nothing more than the freedom necessary for doing the academic’s job.
The second school of conceptions of the academic role is that of
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serving the common good. The academic performs this role criticizing
public opinion and promoting freedom, justice, and democracy.
The third school is that of academic exceptionalism. Because they
serve the common good, academics are exceptional beings who deserve
special privileges.
The fourth school views the academic role as critique. That is,
academics must not only serve the common good. They must also turn
inward and criticize the norms of their disciplines, exposing the historical,
political, cultural, racial, etc. biases which underlie those norms.
The fifth school views the academic as a revolutionary. Academics
must be the vanguard of a revolt against the corrupt, oppressive, and unjust
regime that is reflected in all the institutions of society, including the
university and its disciplines.
Fish endorses the first, the “it’s just a job,” conception of the academic
role. Being an academic is being a member of a profession that has its own
standards of competence and that provides a service that others value
sufficiently to sustain that profession. And academic freedom is the
freedom of the profession to set its own standards and to judge competence
and shoddiness thereby. It is a freedom that is limited to academic matters:
for example, is so and so a competent historian and teacher, and are the
claims his book on the American founding based on sufficient evidence and
the most warranted inferences? When the academic acts outside of these
disciplinary roles, as a university employee or as a citizen, he warrants no
more freedom and immunity than other, non-academic, employees and
citizens. Academic freedom stops, so to speak, at the discipline’s edge.
I wholeheartedly agree with Fish on the “it’s just a job” point and its
important, but limited, implications for academic freedom. Indeed, I argued
as much in an article written several years ago:
If academic freedom is not some legal right derived from the First
Amendment, what is it, and what is its importance? To put it
succinctly, academic freedom is that freedom from fear of job reprisals
that is necessary for academics to function as academics. As such, it is
a privilege of academics that carries with it a responsibility, namely to
act as academics.
What is it then to act as an academic? It is, first and foremost, to
follow arguments and evidence where they lead without regard to
whether they will support one’s political goals or enhance one’s
popularity or reputation. The true academic is an advocate only for his
arguments and evidence. He is the antithesis of those who know the
conclusions they wish to reach and cast about for only those arguments
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and that evidence that can be marshalled in support of those
conclusions.1
Given this view of academic role and academic freedom that Fish and I
share, it follows that the First Amendment offers academics no protection
that is not offered non-academics. It does not immunize academics from
otherwise valid content-neutral restrictions, even when those restrictions
impede academic work. Academics can be validly required to receive the
consent of subjects of experiments even if apprising the subjects
undermines the scholarly goal. Academics may be validly prohibited from
killing people or having sex with minors, even if these prohibitions
foreclose access to knowledge. Academics can be validly prohibited from
stealing others’ computers or lab equipment, again, even if those
prohibitions impede their research. And what goes for content-neutral
restrictions goes for content-based ones as well. Academics may not
infringe others’ copyrights in producing scholarship, nor is what they
publish or say in class immunized from defamation suits.
In terms of the First Amendment, then, the position of academics is not
different from that of non-academics. Academics are in a position vis-à-vis
the First Amendment similar to that of members of the press. The freedom
of speech the press possesses is the same freedom others possess.
Moreover, I believe the absence of special free speech privileges for the
press and for academics is a good thing for both. For special speech
privileges granted by government—and courts are part of the government—
would inevitably bring in their wake governmental intervention into
determining who is a bona fide academic or member of the press and acting
as an academic or in the role of the press. Moreover, the special privileges
would likely as well bring government-imposed responsibilities that could
distort the proper functioning of academics and the press.
So the absence of special First Amendment privileges for academics is
a blessing, not a curse, for the academic enterprise. So, too, I believe is the
absence of special employee privileges for academics, either to engage in
the non-academic managerial decision making of the university employer or
to criticize the university’s non-academic decisions with impunity. A
philosophy professor may have views about recruiting students, raising
money, and configuring classrooms, but those views do not come from the
discipline of philosophy and are therefore outside the ambit of academic
freedom, no matter how wise they are. Fish is correct in concluding that
academic freedom does not license a professor’s rejecting the assigned text
for a multi-sectioned course, but it does license him to write a scholarly
critique of that text or of multi-sectioning of courses, etc.
1

Larry Alexander, Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006).
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Let me turn now to disciplinary standards, the adherence to which
defines the academic role as opposed to other roles. Those standards come
into play when academics assess their students and when they participate in
hiring decisions, promotion and tenure decisions, and in assessments of the
work of scholars at other universities. Now those standards can be stated at
a level of generality at which all competent members of the discipline will
agree. When it comes down to particular cases, however, those standards
do not provide algorithms, and disagreements about quality within the
discipline are to be expected. The line between arguments made by other
academics or by students with which I disagree, and those that I find to be
incompetent, is not a bright line. There are positions with which I disagree
that I admit are clearly competently (if not convincingly) supported, and
there are positions that are clearly beyond the pale. In between these polar
cases is a middle ground where one should expect disagreement about
competence among competent academics.
Now, Fish recognizes that one’s academic works and assessments can
never be totally insulated from one’s background and partisan views.
Nevertheless, well-trained academics are capable of suppressing their biases
in their academic work, if not totally, then to a great extent.
Fish is at his best when he addresses the postmodern critique of
disciplinary standards. His principal illustrative foil is Judith Butler. Butler
objects to the self-certifying nature of disciplinary norms. She makes the
standard postmodern move in pointing out the cultural, linguistic, and other
contingencies that produce such norms. She thinks, incorrectly, that this
insight both discredits the disciplinary norms and that it licenses academics
to use their positions as platforms for political advocacy.
Fish disagrees with Butler on both points. On the latter, the political
advocacy point, Fish points out that having Butler and other lefties using
their academic positions to advance their political views provides grist for
conservatives like David Horowitz to urge that academic departments be
more politically balanced—i.e., that conservative academics be hired in
greater numbers. I agree with Fish that this is the wrong cure for the Butler
disease; though I sympathize with conservative critics of the striking
political imbalance in the academy because of the abuse of the academic
role that so many lefties, like Butler, are guilty of, not only in what they
teach and write, but also in their hiring and tenure decisions. Still, like
Fish, I think the political balance remedy amounts to throwing in the towel
and conceding that politics is a legitimate academic pursuit. (For the same
reason, I oppose affirmative action in faculty hiring. Whether it’s hiring
conservatives for ideological balance or hiring blacks, Hispanics, or women
for “diversity,” using non-academic criteria in decisions that should be
made solely based on disciplinary standards, is a terrible idea. Behind it
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lies the “save the world” conception of the role that Fish and I both reject.)
Does the postmodern critique discredit the disciplinary standards so
central to Fish’s and my view of academic freedom? Not in the least. To
explain, allow me to digress for a moment and recapitulate points that I
made in my earlier pieces on academic freedom.
Most disciplines worthy of being called disciplines and represented in
universities are concerned with claims that fall into one of three large
categories. The largest category is that of descriptive claims—claims
about the past, the present, and the future. Descriptive claims in the
hard sciences come in all three varieties. In the social sciences,
historians in history, political science, sociology, and economics
departments make claims about the past. Sociologists, political
scientists, and economists make claims about the present and provide
models for predicting the future. There are well-established criteria for
determining whether their evidence and arguments satisfy disciplinary
standards. (If there are not, then the discipline is not in fact a
discipline.) Natural and social scientific claims should be assessable
with respect to whether they meet appropriate standards of argument
and evidence without regard to the assessor’s political sympathies.
There are other disciplines within the university whose knowledge
claims are not descriptive of the past, present, or future. Normative
claims are a branch of philosophy, and there are well-established
disciplinary standards for assessing such claims that do not depend on
one’s normative commitments, or at least not on one’s superficial
normative commitments. John Rawls and Robert Nozick were both
fine normative philosophers, worthy of their Harvard appointments,
but they disagreed considerably over what is just. Nonetheless, despite
those disagreements, each could recognize the other’s academic merits.
[Then] . . . there are conceptual knowledge claims that make up a
considerable amount of what philosophers do and are the staple of
logicians and mathematicians.2
Finally, there is a fourth form of disciplinary knowledge, one that is
emblematic of literary analysis and criticism: “interpretive” knowledge.
Interpretive claims offer themselves as bases for understanding works
of literature and art that are not reducible to straightforward factual
claims, like what authors intended, or to straightforward value claims.
Interpretive claims present the literary or artistic work as a window
through which to view basic truths about the human condition—its
ambitions, foibles, tragedies, glories, virtues, and vices. A good
2

Id. at 885.
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interpretation or analysis guides the audience to the most perspicuous
window the interpreted work makes available. Moreover, there is a
real discipline involved here. There are real standards for what counts
as a good or bad critical analysis. It is not just de gustibus.3
Having described the various academic disciplines and their basic
methodologies, how does the postmodern critique of the disciplines offered
by Judith Butler and her ilk fare? That critique, recall, is that all criteria for
measuring academic merit are socially constructed, and socially constructed
primarily by white heterosexual males to preserve their power and
privilege. They are nothing but Europhallologocentric tools to oppress
minorities and women.
That the way the “social construction of standards of merit” is
bandied about in today’s academic culture is absolute philosophical
rubbish is a point about which I hope I can be brief. There is, indeed, a
quite respectable philosophical argument going back to Kant that our
very perceptions of the external world are structured by categories of
thought. Kant believed these categories were fixed; whereas after
Kant, Hegel and his successors deemed the categories to be products
of culture and its linguistic accretions. Kant also believed that behind
the constructed phenomenal world lay the noumenal world of thingsin-themselves. Kant’s continental descendants, however, dispensed
with the noumenal world: the socially constructed phenomenal world
is all there is. Postmodernism is the heir to this philosophical tradition
rejecting foundational claims about the nature of reality and
proclaiming reality to be the product of categorization that is socially
and historically contingent.
The postmodern view, like all thoroughgoing skeptical views about
knowledge, is ultimately self-undermining. Like the claims to
knowledge it debunks, it also purports to know something about the
world. Moreover, its view that our categories are socially constructed
is an “is” from which absolutely no “ought” follows. The postmodern
view surely does not entail the claim that we cannot transcend our
cultural categories. Rather, it merely entails the claim that, like the
rebuilding of Neurath’s boat at sea, transcending our cultural
categories is something we cannot do all at once and that when we do
it, we will be using the tools our culture provides us for its own
transcendence. Ultimately, the postmodern emphases on social
construction, perspectivalism, and the ubiquity of “interpretation”
should be no more paralyzing in the normative, literary, and social

3

Id. at 896-97.
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scientific domains than in the hard sciences. As Thomas Nagel has
insightfully argued, although we can never fully attain a “view from
nowhere,” we can do better or worse in approaching such a
perspective, both in scientific and normative matters.
The most sophisticated postmodernists, however, realize that
nothing substantive, and surely nothing normative, follows from the
postmodern point of view. Tell me over and over again that my
thought that it is morally wrong to torture children for sadistic pleasure
is socially constructed—a product of my time, place, language, or
whatever—and you will not make even a dent in my belief that the
view is correct. Tell me that the law of gravity is a social construction,
and I will still not walk out my fourth floor window. (Nor, I might
add, will any postmodernists I know. Neither they nor their insurance
companies are postmodernists in their non-philosophic lives, nor could
they be. That is my point.) Stanley Fish, an icon for many of the
academic postmodernists who believe that the postmodern insight
should topple the standards of merit and criticism that I deem
definitive of the academic enterprise that merits academic freedom,
himself understands that nothing—absolutely nothing—follows from
his postmodernism. He understands, as most of his fellow travelers do
not, that in recruiting postmodernism in its battle to dethrone the
reigning standards, the identity politics crowd has enlisted an unarmed
soldier. In a world where everything is point of view, reducing a
position to a point of view cannot be a criticism of it, nor can it be a
reason for its holders to abandon it. There is no post-modern escape
hatch for the identity politics crowd when it is subjected to ordinary
disciplinary standards of evidence and logical argument.4
So much for the postmodern critique. Fish, I am sure, agrees with my
analysis of the postmodern critique, namely, that it is normatively inert.5
What is true about it is banal, and what is not banal about it is confused.6
What, then, about the “problem” that disciplinary standards freeze out
all challenges to those standards, even if some of these challenges are
merited? Fish, in responding to this criticism of disciplinary standards,

4

Id. at 892-93.
I am sure he agrees because he has said so. Why Fish embraces Richard Rorty’s deflationary
view of historians’ facts puzzles me, however. If there is a reality of present events, then there is a
reality of past ones. And I, perhaps naively, believe historians are attempting to convey to their
audience that past reality. If I were Fish, I would exorcise the postmodern remnant suggested by the
Rorty reference.
6
As I put it in another article, those “who enlist postmodernism to attack established norms have
drafted an unarmed soldier.” Larry Alexander, What We Do, and Why We Do It, 45 STANF. L. REV.
1885, 1897 (1993).
5
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correctly notes that whether these challenges are merited perforce must be
judged by the standards themselves. This, however, does not foreclose
change. The standards may authorize their own alteration. Einstein
replaced Newton because the Newtonian calculations proved inadequate by
their own lights. That is how disciplinary change can and should occur.
Fish quotes Judith Thomson, who argues that “new fields, indeed new ideas
generally, have the burden of proof.”7 Indeed, to abandon our disciplinary
standards in assessing challenges thereto is psychologically impossible
individually and catastrophically anarchic institutionally. Where everyone
is an academic, no one is.
Having agreed with Fish to this point, let me now demur to his attempt
to discredit Robert Post’s view that academic freedom serves the goal of
producing a better informed democratic citizenry and, more generally, the
view that academic freedom serves external goals. That is the “bridge too
far” that I find in Fish’s otherwise justified assault on the politicization of
the academy.
Fish is correct that academic work need not be intended to produce
goods extrinsic to disciplinary knowledge. Proving Fermat’s theorem is an
endeavor worthy of mathematicians even if it has no practical payoff. So,
too, with a historian’s history of England in the early Middle Ages, or an
English professor’s interpretation of Paradise Lost.
Nonetheless, good academic work, even if not guided by extrinsic
goals, does produce things of immense benefit to the world beyond the
academy. A better informed citizenry is one byproduct. But so, too, are
better rocket ships and mousetraps, hardier crops, faster computers,
heightened aesthetic sensibilities, and more agile analytical minds.
Indeed, if the academy did not serve these external goals, even if
indirectly as byproducts of academic work, there would be no reason for the
rest of society to support the academic enterprise. Why should others spend
scarce resources on activities that are only of benefit to those who engage in
them? Again, to say that the academy must produce valuable goods for
others is not to say that producing such goods should guide academic
inquiry. On this point, Fish is correct. But one can serve a goal without
being guided by it; and in the case of academic disciplines, one can best
produce these extrinsic goods if one is not guided by the aim of producing
them. The argument is an indirect consequentialist one, but it is
nevertheless consequentialist. And Fish should embrace it. In the end, his
salary depends on others’ belief in it.

7 STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO REVOLUTION
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 44) (on file with FIU Law Review) (citing Judith Jarvis Thompson,
Ideology And Faculty Selection, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 160).

